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F uthermore, for ￿ su￿ciently close to one, w e also ha v e by Lemma 4
that ~ w
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( i; k ) < ~ w
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( i; k ). Conse-
quen tly cartel f i; k g do es not form.
8.2.6 Supp ose that ￿rm i is the last ￿rm to declare:
The argumen ts to pro v e the results stated in the prop osition are so close than
those used in the previous case that w e omit them here.
9 Lemma 4
Let the maximal pa y o￿ that ￿rm k can obtain in V
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Lemma 4: Supp ose all our assumptions except assumption 2 hold.
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for all ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; 1) ~ w
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The pro of is a v ailable up on request.
338.2.5 Supp ose that ￿rm j is the last ￿rm to declare:
1. Let ￿rm k b e the second ￿rm to declare. F or the cartel f i; j g to form
















is allow ed only if ￿rm j , facing tw o




). In this case ￿rm
j will obtain at most W
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( i; j ) while ￿rm k will obtain a zero pa y o￿.
However, by Lemma 1, if ￿ is su￿cien tly close to one then for an y d
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( j; k ) > 0. Therefore cartel f i; j g do es not
form.
































￿rm k can obtain a pa y o￿ of at least W
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( j; k ) while it obtains at most
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. By Lemma 1, for ￿ su￿cien tly close
to one, W
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( i; k ) <W
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( j; k ) and consequen tly cartel f i; k g do es not
form.























: g .F or cartel f i; j g to form a necessary condition is that ￿rm k mak es







6= ; . But if ￿rm k mak es such a
declaration it will obtain a zero pa y o￿ while w e kno w by Lemma 1







it obtains a pa y o￿ strictly greater than w
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= ; . Consequen tly cartel f i; j g do es not form.
Now for cartel f i; k g to form it is necessary that ￿rm k mak es a dec-
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and cartel f i; k g do es not form. Con-
328.2.4 Supp ose that ￿rm k is the last ￿rm to declare:
1. Let ￿rm j b e the second ￿rm to declare. F or the cartel f i; j g to form
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. By Lemma 1 w e kno w
that, for ￿ su￿cien tly close to one, W
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( j; k ) >W
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( i; j ) and therefore
cartel f i; j g do es not form.
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( j; k ) > 0. Therefore
cartel f i; k g do es not form.
2. Let ￿rm i b e the second ￿rm to declare. F or the cartel f i; j g to
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. By Lemma 1, for ￿ su￿cien tly
close to one, W
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( i; k ) is stricly greater than W
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( i; j ) and therefore
cartel f i; j g do es not form.





























). In this situation ￿rm j will obtain a zero pa yo￿
while ￿rm k will obtain at most W
￿k
( i; k ). How ev er, by Lemma 1, w e














( j; k ) > 0. Consequen tly cartel
f i; k g do es not form.
Summing up, if k is the last ￿rm to declare, Lemma 1 is su￿cien t to
ensure that the cartel whic h form is either f j; k g or N .
31satisfy: (i) d
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, i.e. ￿rm j
prop oses the formation of cartel f i; j g , then ￿rm k will receiv e a zero









.H o w ever, for ￿ su￿cien tly close to one, Lemma 1 ensures
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= 0. Therefore cartel f i; j g do es not form.
3. Let ￿rm j b e the second ￿rm to declare. Firm k receiv es zero if f i; j g
forms. This, ho we v er, can b e prev en ted by ￿rm k : from Lemma 1, it




( i; j ) and s = f i; k g . Therefore,
since a cartel forms and using subgame p erfection, f i; j g cannot form.
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Remark immediately since f i; j g , f i; k g and f j; k g are sim ultaneously







T o b egin with let us c haracterize the b est-resp onses of the last ￿rm to
declare. F or the generalit y of the argumen t w e shall index the last ￿rm by
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Firm i will nev er mak e a declaration like d
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( N ) whic h is strictly smaller than the pa y o￿ it will obtain
if it decalares d
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by Lemma 1 that W
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Therefore ￿rm i will nev er declare d
j
i
and the cartel f i; j g do es not
form.
8.2.2 Supp ose that ￿rm i is the second ￿rm to declare:
1. Let ￿rm k b e the last ￿rm to declare. An y b est-resp onse for this ￿rm
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( i; k ). This
implies that cartel f i; j g do es not form.
2. Let ￿rm j b e the last ￿rm to declare. Reasoning as ab o v e, it follo ws
that al l ￿rm i ’s b est-resp onses to d
k
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Therefore cartel f i; j g do es not form.
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29(b) Remark that if ￿rm j w ere the last ￿rm to declare a similar rea-
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2. (a) Let us consider the problem faced by the second ￿rm to declare,
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(b) If ￿rm k w ere the second ￿rm to declare a similar reasoning will
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28App endix
8 Pro of of Prop osition 1
8.1 Ac artel forms.
The pro of that a cartel forms is straigh tforw ard and it is therefore omitted.




, then c artel f i; j g do es not
form.





= 0. Obviously , it is useless to consider strategies that lead to the
formation of cartel N since w e are only in terested to pro ve that cartel f i; j g
do es not form.
8.2.1 Supp ose that ￿rm i is the ￿rst ￿rm to declare:
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25resp onding to the costless reen try case. Indeed, a ￿rm whic h can b e forced
to exist can commit to ob ey an agreemen t in whic h it receiv es a zero pa y o￿.
Without this p ossibilit y of commitmen t, such an agreemen t is not credible
in the no-reentry case while it is in the case of costless reen try . Conse-
quen tly , the result stated in Lemma 2 will hold ev en if reen try is unpro￿table
and the exiting ￿rm is the one with the highest a v erage cost function (see
Prop osition 2 for a more precise statemen t). Therefore the cost ine￿ciencies
disapp ear once court ordering is allow ed for. Remark that this clearly sho ws
that considering tacit co op eration b et w een ￿rms as illegal is p ossibly costly .
Let us no w turn to the asset sp eci￿c c haracter of in v estmen ts. In v est-
men ts are said wholly asset sp eci￿c if they are unredeplo y able. Accordingly
in v estmen t costs are sunk for wholly asset sp eci￿c in v estmen ts while they
are ￿xed when in v estmen t lo oses its asset sp eci￿c c haracter. The main con-
sequence of the presence of asset sp eci￿c in v estmen t is the o ccurence of the
fundamental tr ansformation . The latter concept refers to the transformation
in the nature of the comp etition prev ailing b efore and after the adoption of
the contract.
In our context, the sunk reen try cost w e ha v e in tro duced can simply
b e in terpreted as the cost of unredeplo y able in v estmen ts. More precisely ,
the unpro￿table reen try case corresp onds to the situation where large asset
sp eci￿c in v estmen ts m ust b e achiev ed b efore b eing activ e on the mark et
while in the costless reen try case such in v estmen ts are negligible. When
reen try is unpro￿table the fundamental transformation o ccurs since, once
a ￿rm exits, the pro duction game b ecomes a tw o play ers game. If instead
reen try is costless this transformation do es not o ccur. Indeed, in this case
ev en if a ￿rm exits it can participate to the punishmen t of a deviation from
the equilibrium path by one of the tw o ￿rms whic h remain on the mark et.
In other w ords the pro duction game still in v olves three play ers ev en if a ￿rm
exits the mark et. As w e ha v e sho wn, cost ine￿ciencies app ear only in the
case of unpro￿table reen try whic h means that the presence of large asset
sp eci￿c in v estmen ts is a necessary condition for such cost ine￿ciencies to
o ccur.
24relationship b et w een our analysis and the transaction cost approac h. In-
deed although the latter approac h fo cuses mainly on the in ternal organisa-
tion of the ￿rm the presen t study sho ws that the basic p oints whic h distin-
guish transaction cost economics from other economic approc hes are also w ell
suited to study the comp osition of an industry and more generally to mak e
substan tial progresses in the understanding of the formation and comp osition
of groups or coalitions on a mark et.
Roughly sp eaking transaction cost economics seeks to analyse situations
in v olving agen ts c haracterized by opp ortunism and b ounde dr ationality where
( i ) agen ts will meet fr e quently ,( ii ) agen ts do not rely on courts for settling
disputes among them i.e. private or dering prev ails, ( iii ) agen ts ha v e the
opp ortunity to mak e asset sp e ci￿c investments and ( iv ) agen ts ev olv ei n a n
unc ertain en vironmen t.
In the presen t analysis w e ha v e ruled out b oth uncertain t y and b ounded
rationality since these c haracteristics app ear unessential for our results. Note
furthermore that frequency will not b e relev an t here as the example giv en
in the In tro duction p oints out. The di￿erence b et w een opp ortunism and
self-in terested b ehavior do es not matter here b ecause the set of subgame
p erfect Nash equilibria and the set of Nash equilibria of the pro duction game
coincides for a discount factor su￿cien tly close to zero. W e shall ho we v er
argue that if w e mak e abstraction of the presence of either priv ate ordering
or asset sp eci￿c in v estmen ts then the cost ine￿ciencies obtained in the pap er
disapp ear.
Let us b egin with priv ate ordering. Many exchange analysis supp ose that
e￿cacious rules of law are in place so that an y disagreemen t regarding the
execution of a contract is settled by courts in a fully informed and low-cost
wa y . This assumption of court ordering is v ery conv enien t since it allows to
disregard the ex-p ost side of a contract. In our context, ￿rms cannot rely
on court since the kind of contract they are willing to do is simply illegal.
An immediate consequence of priv ate ordering is that w e cannot disregard
the execution phase of the contract since the latter m ust b e self enforcing.
This en tails that ￿rms, as is supp osed in the cartel formation game, will only
consider pa y o￿ v ectors whic h can b e asso ciated with a subgame p erfect Nash
equilibrium of the pro duction game.
But supp ose to the contrary that ￿rms can rely costlessly on court to
enforce an agreemen t. This implies that the set of pa yo￿ v ectors that m ust
now b e considered in the cartel formation game coincides with the one cor-
23This sho ws the robustness of our conclusions with resp ect to the in￿uence
of the exiting ￿rm on the w a yp a y o￿s are allo cated in the pro duction game.
7 Concluding remarks
W eh a ve considered in this pap er a dynamic pro duction game in v olving three
￿rms whic h are di￿eren tiated according to their cost function. More precisely
we h a ve assumed that ￿rms can b e ranked unam biguously according to their
marginal cost function and that their ￿xed cost ma y di￿er. F urthermore w e
supp ose that one ￿rm can b e credibly forced to sta y out of the mark et by
the tw o others and that at least tw o ￿rms can b e put under such a threat.
W e then in v estigate the cost c haracteristics of the exiting ￿rm under tw o
alternativ e hyp othesis concerning the p ossibilit y of reen try namely the case
where reen try is unpro￿table in an y circumstances due to the presence of
large sunk costs, and the one where reen try is costless.
W eh a ve obtained tw o predictions (whic h app ears quite robust to the
sp eci￿cation of the cartel formation game). First if reen try is alwa ys unprof-
itable then the exiting ￿rm has the low est marginal cost function as compared
with the marginal cost function of the ￿rms whic h can credibly b e predated.
F urthermore this result do es not dep end on the lev el of ￿xed costs
16
. Ac-
cordingly , in this case, cost ine￿ciencies will arise since the exiting ￿rm is
the one whic h uses the most e￿cien t tec hnology .
A second result is that when reen try is costless and when w e can rank
￿rms according to their a verage cost function then the exiting ￿rm has the
larger a v erage cost function as compared to the a verage cost function of the
￿rms whic h can b e put under the threat of predation. Therefore in this case
cost ine￿ciencies do not app ear.
The result obtained in the no-reentry case lo oks strange since it go es
against the common b elief that the most e￿cien t ￿rm will remain on the
mark et. But this b elief has b een dev elopped in the context of \neo-classical
economics". If instead w e lo ok at this result from the p oint of view of \trans-
action cost economics" (as dev elopped in Williamson (1985) for instance)
then they app ear rather unsurprising. Indeed in this context such kind of
ine￿ciencies are frequen tly obtained. It is w orth while emphasizing the deep
16
How ever the set of ￿rms which can b e predated dep end obviously on the level of ￿xed
costs.
22Notice that the ￿rst additional assumption in this Lemma will simply
guaran tee that there exists a feasible pa yo￿ v ector strictly greater than the
Cournot equilibrium pro￿ts v ector.
Again an increase in ￿
j
will ha vet w o e￿ects on the co op erativ e bargaining
game in v olving ￿rms i and j : On the one hand, it leads to a mo di￿cation in
the set of feasible outcomes whic h a￿ects negatively the pa yo￿ of ￿rm i at the
egalitarian solution while, on the other hand, it increases (resp. decreases)
￿rm i ’s (resp. ￿rm j ’s) statu-quo pa y o￿ whic h will rise the ￿rm i ’s pa yo￿ at
the egalitarian solution. The Lemma
14
states simply that the p ositiv e e￿ect
arising from the mov e in the statu-quo pa y o￿ dominates the negative e￿ect
coming from the reduction in the set of feasible outcomes.
This result will play , for Prop osition 3 b elo w, the role play ed by Lemma 1
and 2 for Prop osition 1 and 2 resp ectiv ely .T o see this it su￿ces to realize
that the set of subgame p erfect equilibria of the game deriving from the tw o
step pro cedure here considered coincides with the one of the cartel formation
game where a ￿rm i ’s declaration consists of a feasible cartel, s
i
, to whic h ￿rm
i b elongs and of a pa y o￿ v ector whic h giv es to eac h ￿rm in s
i
the symmetric
egalitarian pa yo￿ de￿ned ab o ve
15
and a zero pa yo￿ to a ￿rm (if an y) whic h
do es not b elong to s
i
.F ormally the set of ￿rm i ’s declarations is no w D
i
=





( s ) and, for l 62 s; p
l
=0 g .
Therefore w e ha ve:
Prop osition 3 Let al l assumptions in L emma 3 hold. Then ther e exists
￿ ￿<1 such that for al l ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; 1) and whatever the or der of de clar ation we
have:
1. A c artel forms,




, then c artel f i; j g do es not form,






, then c artels f i; j g
and f i; k g do not form.
14
The pro of of this result comes quite straightforwardly from the application of the
envelop e theorem as well as the F olk theorem. Hence it will b e omitted.
15
T o save space we do not de￿ne formally the egalitarian payo￿ when the three ￿rms
are activ e. How ever this can easily b e done ev en if one wan ts to consider a coalition form
game instead of a co op erative bargaining game. Anywa y this do es not matter for our
analysis.
21solutions as axiomatized by Kalai (1977) and Kalai and Samet (1985)
11 12
.
T o b e precise, let us ￿rst assume that:
Assumption 7 F or any fe asible c artel, s , the Cournot e quilibrium in the




( i; j ) denote the ￿rm i ’s Cournot equilibrium pro￿t when only
￿rms i and j are activ e on the mark et. F urthermore denote by ( q
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the symmetric egalitarian solution
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to the co op erativ e bargaining game de-
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W e can immediately state:
Lemma 3 Let al l our assumptions exc ept 2 b e satis￿e d. F urthermor e, for
any fe asible two-￿rms c artel, say f h; l g , supp ose that ( q
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( h; l ) ;q
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l
( h; l )) b elongs
to ]0 ; ￿ q
h
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l









Then ther e exists ￿ ￿<1 such that, for al l ￿> ￿ ￿, P
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This kind of structure has already b een used in the literature. F or instance, in Gross-
man and Hart (1986), two agents ￿rst c ho ose non-co op eratively and sim ultaneously a
level of in v estmen t and then, giv en these in v estmen ts, take actions suc h that the gains
from renegotiation, which corresp ond to the gains from co op eration in our framew ork,
is shared equally . In their con text, this corresp onds also to the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. The Gro osman and Hart’s analysis has b een extended by Hart and Mo ore (1990)
to man y agents and the bargaining solution adopted there to share the gain from trade is
the Shapley v alue.
W e adopt here an egalitarian solution one the one hand b ecause it is m uc h more tractable
than the other ones (in particular the Nash bargaining solution), and on the other hand
b ecause the egalitarian solutions are the only ones which, in the presence of other stan-
dard requirements, satisfy the monotonicit y prop ert y (see Kalai and Samet (1985)). This
condition simply states that if the feasible set of one coalition increases and the feasible
sets of all other coalitions remain the same, then none of the mem b ers of this coalition
should b ecome worse o￿ b ecause of this c hange.
12
Note that similar results could b e obtained by using the symmetric Nsah bargaining
solution.
13
It will b e obvious to verify that the results presen ted b elo w will hold if we take an
asymmetric egalitarian solution provided the weigh t of ￿rm i in the solution dep ends
negativ ely on ￿
i
and is indep enden t on the ￿xed costs level.
206 Robustness of the results with unpro￿table
reen try
One sp eci￿c feature of the cartel formation game presen ted ab o v e is that
eac h ￿rm in its declaration prop oses simultane ously a particular cartel and
the pa yo￿s that eac h mem b er of the cartel will receiv e. As a consequence,
the cartel formation game giv es to al l ￿rms a strong in￿uence on the w a y
payo￿s are allo cated among cartel mem b ers.
This seems reasonable when reen try costs are negligible. In this case
indeed the pro duction game remains a three play ers game ev en if a ￿rm exits
the mark et. Howev er when reen try costs are large, the pro duction game
b ecomes a tw o play ers game once a ￿rm decides to sta y out of the mark et.
In this case one can ask the question if the cartel formation game do es not giv e
to the exiting ￿rm an unrealistically excessiv e in￿uence on the equilibrium of
the resulting tw o ￿rms pro duction game whic h shall b e play ed. In order to
pro vide an answ er, w e shall analyze the sensitivit y of the ine￿ciencies stated
in Prop osition 1 to the w a y ￿rms are supp osed to co ordinate.
T oi n v estigate this issue w e lo ok at a tw o step co ordination pro cess where
the exiting ￿rm has no in￿uence on the w a y the remaining ￿rms will share the
gains from co op eration in the pro duction game. This co ordination pro cess
constitutes a game: its ￿rst step is a substitute for the cartel formation game
presen ted b efore. The only di￿erence is that it is no w supp osed that a ￿rm
declaration only consists of a feasible cartel, s . If all declarations di￿er the
game ends and eac h ￿rm receiv es its reserv ation pa yo￿ ￿ g
i
. Otherwise one
mo ves to the second step.
The second step consists of a negotiation b et w een the memb ers of the
c artel given in the identic al de clar ations of the ￿rst step ,s a y s , to determine
ap a y o￿ v ector, p, b elonging to V
￿
( s ). If a ￿rm do es not b elong to s then its
action set in this step is simply f do nothing g .
W e shall not sp ecify explicitely the bargaining game pro cedure. W e as-
sume instead that, the gains from co op eration (i.e. the actual pa yo￿ min us
the sum of appropriately discounted Cournot pro￿ts of the one-shot quan tit y
game) are shared according to a bargaining solution. The bargaining solution
w e adopt here b elongs to the family of egalitarian (also called prop ortional)
19This Prop osition
9
contrasts with our previous results in tw o w a ys: First,
the grand cartel, N , do es not form, so that if seeing that there exists a
predatory strategy it will b e play ed i.e. pr e dation o c curs . This comes from the
fact that, as long as cartels f i; j g and f i; k g are feasible, the minimal pa yo￿
￿rms j and k will obtain in b oth a tw o-￿rm cartel and in the grand cartel is
equal to zero. It then follo ws that ￿rm i can alwa ys obtain a larger pa yo￿
in a tw o-￿rm cartel than in the grand cartel (see Lemma 3). Consequen tly
if ￿rm i is the ￿rst ￿rm to declare it will nev er prop ose the formation of the
grand cartel. On the other hand if it is ￿rm j (resp. ￿rm k ) whic h is the
￿rst to declare then it will nev er prop ose the formation of the grand cartel.
Indeed if it do es so then b oth ￿rm i and ￿rm k (resp. ￿rm j ) can obtain a
higher pa yo￿ than the one prop osed in ￿rm j ’s (resp. ￿rm k ’s) declaration
by making compatible declarations whic h prop ose the formation of the cartel
f i; k g (resp. f i; j g ).
The second di￿erence b et w een the results with costless reen try and the
ones with unpro￿table reen try can b e illustrated if w e supp ose that ￿rms
have iden tical ￿xed costs
10
. In this case ^ q
j
( q ) < ^ q
k










. Then Prop osition 2 states simply that the
￿rm with the highest marginal cost function will b e predated. Therefore
with costless reen try , contrary to what happ ens in the unprop￿table reen try
case, a low marginal cost constitues a strong adv antage to face predation.













. Hence w e
￿nd back a result stated ￿rst by Ghema w at and Nalebu￿ (1985) for declining
industries according to whic h the ￿rm with the largest capacities i.e. with the
highest ￿xed cost lev el is the ￿rst ￿rm to exit the mark et. Such conclusion
has also b e dra wn by F udenb erg and Tirole (1986) from the analysis of an
incomplete information game.
T o conclude with, if w e are able to rank the ￿rms with resp ect to their
average cost function then Prop osition 2 states that the exiting ￿rm is the
one with the highest a verage cost function.
9
The pro of of this Prop osition follo ws so closely that of Prop osition 1 that it s omitted.
10




( i; j ). Accordingly if cartels f i; j g and f i; k g are feasible, that
is, if w
￿j
( N ) and w
￿k
( N ) are negative, then the minimal pa yo￿ obtained by
￿rms j and k in these cartels are equal to zero. Therefore, the highest pa yo￿
￿rm i can obtain in a cartel, W
￿i
( s ), dep ends on b oth the marginal and ￿xed
costs of its partner. More precisely , let q
0
h
b e the riv al’s output whic h leads

































( q ) b e the smallest quan tit y pro duced by h whic h giv es it a zero pro￿t
whenev er its riv als pro duce q , that is, ^ q
h









( q ) ;q ) =@ q
h
> 0. W eh a ve :
Lemma 2 Supp ose al l our assumptions exc ept assumption 1 hold. Ther e









) ar e such that ^ q
k
( q ) > ^ q
j








( i; j )>
W
￿i
( i; k ) >W
￿i
( N ) for al l ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; 1) .
Considering Figure 2, the pro of of this result is clearly quite ob vious
and is thus omitted. It m ust b e noticed that a necessary and su￿cien t
condition for W
￿i
( i; j ) >W
￿i
( i; k ) to hold w ould in v olve a comparison of the
cost structure of the three ￿rms. W e thus c ho ose to state our results in terms
of a su￿cien t condition whic h actually requires only the comparison of ￿rms
j and k av erage cost function.
Clearly , Lemma 2 here will play the role of Lemma 1 in the case of no-
reen try . It therefore follo ws:
Prop osition 2 Supp ose al l our assumptions exc ept assumption 1 hold. Ther e
exists ￿ ￿<1 such that for al l ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; 1) and for any or der of de clar ation we
have:
1. A c artel forms,
2. let S = ff i; j g ; f i; k g ;N g and ^ q
j
( q )< ^ q
k







c artels f i; k g and N do not form,
3. let S = ff i; j g ; f i; k g ; f j; k g ;N g and ( i )^ q
i
( q ) < ^ q
j







, ( ii )^ q
i
( q ) < ^ q
k






, ( iii )^ q
j
( q ) < ^ q
k







then c artels f i; k g ; f j; k g and N do not form.
17of ￿rm i
8
. This sho ws that the a v ailabilit y of a predatory strategy is not
su￿cien t for predation to o ccur.
Finally , Part 3 of Prop osition 1 corresp onds to the example giv en in the
In tro duction ab o v e, except for the feasibilit y of the grand cartel. How ev er,
to ha v e the same prediction, i.e. that the low marginal cost ￿rm is excluded
for all orders of declarations, tw o additional requirements are needed. The
￿rst is that the maximal capacit y of ￿rm j is smaller than that of ￿rm i ;
the second is that the maximal pa yo￿ that j can obtain in the cartel f i; j g
is larger than the one it can obtain in cartel ( N ). These conditions seem
fairly unrestrictiv e: as ￿rm i has a low er marginal cost function than j it
is reasonable to assume that it has installed a higher capacit y; while it is
quite plausible that a ￿rm can obtain more in a tw o-￿rm than in a three-
￿rm cartel. ob viously, if cartel ( N ) w as not feasible, as in the in tro ductory
example, then this second condition is trivially met.
As it can b e seen from the Pro of of Prop osition 1 in the App endix, these
two conditions are sup er￿uous for all orders of declaration except when k is
the ￿rst to declare. In this case k in order to induce j to en ter the cartel
f j; k g m ust giv e to j ap a y o￿ at least as great as the maxim um pa yo￿ that
j could obtain in the cartel f i; j g , W
￿j
( i; j ). The same is true if k wa n ts to
induce i to en ter the cartel f i; k g , that is k m ust giv e W
￿i
( i; j ). Th us, k will
prefer the cartel f j; k g if it gets a higher pa yo￿ in it rather than in f i; k g ,
giv en the constrain ts imp osed by what he m ust o￿er to j and i . This is the
case if the conditions in Part 3 of Prop osition 1 are met, as it is sho wn by
Lemma 4 in the App endix.
5 Equilibria of the cartel formation game
with costless reen try
It has b een sho wn in section 2.3, that the case with costless reen try di￿ers
from the one with unpro￿table reen try only by the fact that in the former
case the minimal pa yo￿ required by a ￿rm, sa y j , to participate to a tw o-
￿rms cartel, sa y f i; j g , is equal to max f 0;w
￿j
( N ) g while in the latter case
8
Note that if the cartel f j; k g were also feasible then the grand cartel could form with
￿rm i b eing the ￿rst ￿rm to declare and ￿rm j (resp. ￿rm k ) the second one provided
that W
￿j
(j; k ) (resp. W
￿k
(j; k )) is strictly smaller than the highest pay o￿ ￿rm j (resp.
￿rm k ) can obtain in V
￿
(N ).
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)). Moreov er, by assumption 3, marginal cost is increasing in ￿ so
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is strictly negative for an y giv en q
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decreases. As sho wn
in Figure 1 the result then follo ws. 2
As sho wn by the pro of, the ￿xed cost do es not matter since it a￿ects
b oth sides of the constrain t in the maximization program in the same w a y .
Hence, for an y quan tit y pro duced by ￿rm i , the quan tit y required to satisfy
the constrain t is indep enden t of the ￿xed cost. On the other hand, the lev el
of ￿ , i.e. the level of the marginal cost for a giv en quan tit y pro duced, a￿ects
the constrain t i n t wo wa ys. First, if the right-hand side of the constrain t
w ere indep enden t of ￿ then, in the co ordinates of Figure 1, ￿rm k ’s isopro￿t





re￿ects the adv antage to form a cartel with a low marginal cost ￿rm. Second,
howe v er, the minimal pa y o￿ required by a ￿rm to participate in a cartel
with ￿rm i clearly decreases with ￿ . This translates the in tuition that a low
marginal cost ￿rm will b e more greedy than a ￿rm with a higher marginal
cost. What the Lemma states is that the second e￿ect dominates the ￿rst
one.




, ￿rm k can alwa ys giv e to
￿rm i a greater pa yo￿ than the highest pa y o￿ ￿rm i can obtain with ￿rm j .
On the other hand if cartel f i; j g forms then ￿rm k will receiv e a zero pa yo￿
while it will obtain at least w
￿k
( i; k ) > 0 if cartel f i; k g forms. Hence, lo osely
sp eaking, ￿rm k has alwa ys the opp ortunity and the willingness to prev en t
the formation of cartel f i; j g so that this cartel cannot form.
Remark that w e cannot exclude the formation of the grand cartel, N ,
for all orders of declaration. Indeed consider, for instance, the case where




and ￿rm i is the ￿rst ￿rm to declare.
If w
￿k
( i; k ) is su￿cien tly large it could happ en that W
￿i
( i; k ) is strictly
smaller than the greatest pa y o￿ ￿rm i can obtain in V
￿
( N ). Consequen tly ,
￿rm i will prop ose the formation of the grand cartel and the b est either ￿rm
j or ￿rm k (or b oth) can do is to mak e a declaration compatible with that
15is the one with the low est marginal cost function once there exists a feasible
cartel to whic h this ￿rm do es not b elong. Accordingly a low marginal cost
function and, since the results do not dep end on the lev el of ￿xed costs, a low
average cost function is not an adv antage to surviv e in a mark et, if w e except
its role in the determination of the set of feasible cartels. Put in another w a y ,
our results suggest that to face predation the use of a tec hnology leading to
a small ￿xed cost and a (relativ ely) high marginal cost function do pro vide
strong adv antages with resp ect to the use of a tec hnology leading to a large
￿xed cost and a low marginal cost function.
The cornerstone underlying our results is:
Lemma 1 Supp ose al l our assumptions exc ept 2 hold and let W
￿i
( s ) b e the
highest p ayo￿ ￿rm i c an obtain in V
￿
( s ) . Then ther e exists ￿ ￿< 1 such that
for al l ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; 1) , W
￿i
( i; j ) <W
￿i





Pro of: Let W
i
( s ) b e the highest pa yo￿ ￿rm i can obtain in W ( s ). If w e
are able to pro v e that W
i
( i; j ) <W
i





will follo w immediately by the application of the F olk Theorem.
It is ob vious that:
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i
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( i; k ):
Remark immediately that the constrain ts in these optimization programs do






, the constrain ts in these maximization programs are satis￿ed if














) resp ectiv ely . Under our assumptions














.F uthermore for an y
giv en q
i
2 [0 ; ￿ q
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( i; j ).
Since ￿
j
















for h; l 2 s
On the other hand, w e shall sa y that c artel s wil l not form for a giv en
order of declaration if and only if there do es not exist at least one subgame
p erfect Nash equilibrium of the cartel formation game satisfying the ab o ve
requiremen t.
As one could exp ect subgame p erfect equilibria of the cartel formation
game di￿er according to the order of declaration. How ev er w e can iden tify
the cartels whic h do not form whatever the order of declaration. Let W
￿i
( s )
b e the highest one-p erio d pro￿t that ￿rm i can obtain in W
￿
( s ). Then,
Prop osition 1 Supp ose al l our assumptions exc ept assumption 2 hold. Then
ther e exists ￿ ￿< 1 such that for al l ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; 1) and whatever the or der of
declar ation we have:
1. A c artel forms,




, then c artel f i; j g do es not form,






, then (a) c artel f i; j g






( i; j ) ￿ W
￿j
( N )
then c artels f i; j g and f i; k g do not form.
Fixed costs, marginal cost functions and capacit y constrain ts determine
all together whic h cartels are feasible i.e. whic h ￿rms can b e forced to sta y out
by the tw o others. How ev er on the basis of marginal cost functions alone w e
can conclude that if the ￿rm with the highest mar ginal c ost function b elongs
to a fe asible two-￿rms c artel then it wil l stay in the market . This means
that a su￿cient condition for the highest marginal cost ￿rm to surviv e is the
existence of a partner with whic h it can predate the third ￿rm. F urthermore







( i; j ) ￿ W
￿j
( N ) then w e can
b e more precise ab out the surviv al of the low est marginal cost ￿rm. Indeed in
this case the results state that if a ￿rm is forced to sta y out of the mark et it
7
As the reader will see in the pro of of Lemma 4 the result will hold under the weaker

















































































Accordingly ￿rm i will receiv e its prop osed pa yo￿ p
ii
if its declaration is




) or that of




) or b oth. If the declarations of ￿rms j and k are compati-
ble then ￿rm i will obtain the pa yo￿ assigned to it in the ￿rm j ’s declaration.
This pa yo￿ assignmen t follo ws from the fact that, once tw o ￿rms agree to
play according to a partiacular equilibrium of the pro duction game, the third
one’s b est resp onse in the pro duction game is to play according to this equi-
librium to o. Consequen tly all ￿rms will receiv e the pa y o￿ corresp onding to
the equilibrium up on whic h tw o ￿rms ha ve decided to co ordinate. Finally ,i f
all the declarations are pairwise incompatible no agreemen t is p ossible and
￿rm i will receiv e some predetermined pa yo￿ ￿ g
i
.W e supp ose that ￿rm i ’s
reserv ation pa yo￿, ￿ g
i
, corresp onds to the w orst pa yo￿ it can obtain in the
pro duction game ￿
￿
or, in other w ords, the b est pa yo￿ ￿rm i can guaran tee




= max f 0;w
￿i
( N ) g8 i 2 N .T o end up






) leads to a declaration
v ector the pa y o￿ of ￿rm i in the cartel formation game will b e giv en by g
i
.
4 Equilibria in the cartel formation game
with unpro￿table reen try
W e turn no w to the c haracterization of the equilibria of the cartel formation
game when, in the pro duction game, reen try is unpro￿table i.e. assump-
tion 1 holds. T o simplify the exp osition w e shall in tro duce some pieces of
terminology: W e shall sa y that, for a giv en order of declaration, sa y( i; j; k ),
c artel s forms if and only if, for this order of declaration, there exists a sub-
game p erfect Nash equilibrium of the cartel formation game, ￿
￿
, leading to a































Recall that outside opp ortunities, if there exist, are taken in to accoun t in the sta y
in/sta y out decision, see fo otnote 4.
12to sta y in while ￿rm k has decided to sta y out of the mark et and either
￿rm i or ￿rm j has deviated from their resp ectiv e quan tit y sp eci￿ed in a
giv en strategy com bination. Since reen try is costless, e
i
( N ) and e
j
( N ) are
p erfect equilibrium of this subgame. In other w ords, with costless reen try ,
￿rm k can b e used to punish a deviation by a memb er of the cartel so that
the w orst pa yo￿ a ￿rm, sa y ￿rm i , will obtain if it deviates from a sp eci￿ed
quan tit y is simply the maxim um b et w een 0 and w
￿i
( N ). Note that if car-
tel f j; k g is feasible, if ￿rm i deviates it could b e punished by its exclusion
of the mark et leading to a zero pa y o￿. But since cartel f j; k g is feasible if
and only if w
￿i
( N ) < 0, the w orst pa yo￿ ￿rm i will obtain is still equal to
max f 0;w
￿i
( N ) g . It follo ws that the set of equilibrium pa yo￿ v ector a feasible
two-￿rm cartel s can obtain under assumption 2, V
￿
( s ), is simply equal to
the follo wing set:
V
￿










2F ( s ) ;P
k
= 0 for k 62 s;
and P
i
￿ max f 0;w
￿i
( N ) g8 i 2 s g : (3)
Note that, since w
￿i
( N ) is strictly smaller than w
￿i
( s ) for an y s 6= N to
whic h i b elongs, then V
￿
( s ) is larger than W
￿
( s ).
3 The cartel formation game
Due to the m ultiplicit y of equilibria in the pro duction game, ￿rms m ust
co ordinate up on the play of a particular equilibrium b efore the pro duction
game starts. The w a y ￿rms solve this co ordination problem is describ ed by
a three-stage game where at eac h stage one ￿rm mak es a declaration. The
order in whic h declarations are made is exogeneously giv en and it is common
kno wledge.
A ￿rm i ’s declar ation , d
i
, consists of a feasible cartel, s
i
, to whic h ￿rm













). The set of ￿rm i ’s declarations is thus D
i
= f ( s; p ) j i 2 s; s 2
S and p 2V
￿
( s ) g .F urthermore let H
i
denote the set of declarations preced-
ing that of ￿rm i with H
i
= ; if ￿rm i is the ￿rst to mak e a declaration.







Let d denote a declaration v ector, ￿rm i will receiv e the pa yo ￿ g
i
giv en




resp ectiv ely ,o r e
i
( N ) if ￿rm i did not pro duce
￿ q
i




( N ) if ￿rm j did not pro duce ￿ q
j
while
￿rm i has pro duced ￿ q
i
. This is an equilibrium, in the subgame starting at
the no de where the three ￿rms ha ve en tered the mark et, with ￿rm k having a
negative pa y o￿. Therefore using this equilibrium as a punishmen t triggered
by the ￿rm k ’s decision to sta y in the mark et, ￿rms i and j can force ￿rm k
to sta y out of the mark et at eac h p erio d. W e shall refer to this situation by
saying that the cartel f i; j g is feasible . It m ust b e clear that the feasibilit y
of a particular cartel, sa y f i; j g , neither excludes nor implies the feasibilit y
of another cartel like f i; k g for instance.
T o sum up: w e consider that the grand cartel, N , is alwa ys feasible since,
by assumption 5, there alwa ys exist subgame p erfect equilibria of ￿
￿
where,
along the equilibrium path the three ￿rms decide to sta y in at eac h p erio d.
On the other hand w e sa y that a tw o-￿rms cartel, sa y f i; j g , is feasible if and
only if ￿rms i and j can credibly predate ￿rm k i.e. w
￿k
( N ) < 0
5
.W e shall
denote the set of feasible cartels by S .
Before examining the set of equilibrium pa yo￿ v ectors of a feasible cartel
in the game ￿
￿
, w e m ust recognize that there is a third kind of mark et struc-
ture whic h could emerge namely the monop oly one. How ev er this p ossibilit y
is ruled out, whether reen try is costless or unpro￿table, by assumption 6.
W en o w turn to the c haracterization of the set of equilibrium pa yo￿ v ec-
tors that a feasible cartel, sa y f i; j g , can obtain in a subgame starting after
the decision of ￿rm k to sta y out of the mark et and the decisions of ￿rms i
and j to sta y in the mark et. Consider ￿rst the case where the reen try cost is
so high that it is nev er pro￿table for ￿rm k to decide to sta y in the mark et
at an y p erio d of this subgame (i.e. assumption 1 holds). In this situation
assumption 6 will ensure that ￿rms i and j will decide to sta y in the mark et
at eac h p erio d of the subgame. This immediately implies that the set of
equilibrium pa y o￿ v ectors of the subgame coincides with the set of equilib-
rium pa y o￿ v ectors of the game ￿
￿
( s ) , with s = f i; j g . Therefore w e ha ve
V
￿
( s )= W
￿
( s ) for all feasible tw o-￿rms cartel s .
Consider no w the case where reen try is costless, i.e. assumption 2 holds.
Then the w orst p er-p erio d pa y o￿ ￿rm i will obtain is equal to max f 0;w
￿i
( N ) g .
Indeed consider the subgame whic h starts after ￿rms i and j have decided
5
The use of w
￿k
(N )￿ 0 instead of w
￿k
(N )< 0 in the de￿nition of a feasible cartel do es
not lead to any c hange in the analysis.





( s ), w e h a v e from the F olk Theorem that W
￿
( s ) conv erges to W ( s )
when ￿ tends to one. W e shall furthermore denote by w
￿i
( s ) the minimal
payo￿ ￿rm i can obtain in W
￿
( s ).
2.3 Equilibrium pa y o￿s in ￿
￿
W en o w consider the game ￿
￿
, namely the in￿nite rep etition of the tw o-
stage constituen t game where, at the ￿rst stage, ￿rms decide to sta yi no r
to sta y out of the mark et and, at the second stage, activ e ￿rms decide the
quan tit y they pro duce. Let V
￿
( s ) denotes the set of attainable pa y o￿ v ectors
for cartel s . A t the end of this section it will p ossible to c haracterize V
￿
( s ).
Note that this set will dep end on whic h of the tw o assumptions, 1 or 2, is
taken to hold.
T o b egin with, let us remark that, from assumption 5, there will alwa ys
exist subgame p erfect equilibria in ￿
￿
where along the equilibrium path the
three ￿rms sta y in the mark et at eac h p erio d. The set of pa yo￿ v ectors whic h
can b e obtained at equilibria of this kind is denoted by V
￿
( N ) and it is easily
v eri￿ed that it coincides with W
￿
( N ) \ R
3
+
.W e shall furthermore denote by
e
k
( N ) a subgame p erfect equilibrium of ￿
￿
where the three ￿rms sta yi n a t
eac h p erio d along the equilibrium path and where ￿rm k obtains a p er-p erio d
pro￿t equal to max f 0;w
￿k
( N ) g and eac h other ￿rm, sa y h, obtains a pro￿t
strictly greater than max f 0;w
￿h
( N ) g
3
.
Then let us supp ose that there is a ￿rm, sa y k , such that w
￿k
( N ) < 0.
Consider ￿rst the existence of subgame p erfect equilibria of ￿
￿
where ￿rm
k sta ys out of the mark et at eac h p erio d
4
.F or ￿ su￿cien tly close to one, the
follo wing strategy com bination is a subgame p erfect Nash equilibrium of the
subgame starting after the three ￿rms ha v e decided to sta y in the mark et











)) follo w ed by , w athever the
quan tit y pro duced by ￿rm k , either e
k
( N ) if ￿rms i and j hav e pro duced or
3
Note that there are man y output com binations that giv e ￿rm k ap a y o￿ equal to
w
￿k




W e implicitly assume that ￿rm k ’s outside opp ortunities has a p er p erio d v alue of zero.
Howev er the reader will easily verify that all our results go through if we have assumed
that the p er p erio d v alue of ￿rm i’s outside opp ortunities, i =1 ; 2 ; 3, is giv en by a function
O (￿
i
) satisfying @ O =@ ￿
i




(s) ￿ O (￿
i
) for all p ossible
cartels and work with ^ w
￿i
(s) instead of w
￿i
(s).
92.2 Equilibrium pa y o￿s in ￿
￿
(s)
The typical pa y o￿ for ￿rm i in the game ￿
￿
( s ) is giv en by:
P
i













In￿nitely rep eated games with discounting ha ve b een extensiv ely analysed
in the literature. It has b een established (see, for instance, Theorem 3.2
in Sorin (1992)) that the set of subgame p erfect Nash equilibrium pa yo￿
v ectors of ￿
￿
( s ) conv erges (with resp ect to the Haussdorf top ology) to the
set of individually rational and feasible pa y o￿ v ectors of the constituen t game
as the discount factor tends to one
2
. This is one of the v ersion of the so-called
F olk Theorem. Accordingly , for our purp oses w e only need to c haracterize
the set of individually rational and feasible pa yo￿ v ectors of the Cournot
one-shot game where the set of play ers is giv en by s . This set is denoted
W ( s ).
T o b egin with let us denote the set of feasible pa yo￿ v ectors with three







, F ( N ) and F ( i; j ) are giv en by:





















) for i =1 ; 2; 3 g :


























When the three ￿rms are activ e, eac h activ e ￿rm can guaran tee to itself a
pro￿t giv en by:
w
i























Accordingly the set of individually rational and feasible pa yo￿ v ectors when
￿rms in s b eing activ e and # s ￿ 2 is simply:










2F ( s ) ;P
k





( s ) 8 i 2 s g : (2)
2
Pro vided the set of individually rational and feasible p oin ts has a non-empt y in terior.
This is clearly the case under Assumption 6.
8Note that w e supp ose that ￿rms pro duce p erfect substitutes in order to
b e able to concen trate ourselv es only up on the in￿uence of the cost c harac-
teristics on mark et structure.
F or an activ e ￿rm the pro￿t function (gross of the reen try cost) in the
























= Q ￿ q
i
.W e shall assume:
Assumption 5 F or al l i 2 N , ￿
i




























Obviously these assumptions, together with the restriction that an y activ e
￿rm i m ust c ho ose a quan tit y in [0 ; ￿ q
i
], are su￿cient for the existence of a
Cournot equilibrium. The second part of Assumption 5 will ensure, as w e
shall see later on, that there exists some \agreements" b et w een the three
￿rms with all of them remaining on the mark et. This could b e assumed
awa y , in fact simplifying the analysis without c hanging the results, but it is
k ept for the sak e of generalit y .
The last restriction on the cost and demand functions is that whenev er
only tw o ￿rms are activ e then, for an y quan tit y its opp onen t can pro duce, a
￿rm can achiev e a p ositiv e pro￿t. F ormally , let us de￿ne w
i
( s ) with s = f i; j g
as the minimal pa y o￿ ￿rm i can guaran tee to itself when it faces ￿rm j , i.e.:
w
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Under assumption 4 ￿
i



















), w e ha ve:
w
i







) ; ￿ q
j
)
W e shall require:
Assumption 6 F or al l i; j 2 N , w
i





) < ￿ q
i
.
This will guaran tee on the one hand that the mark et cannot b e mo-













( i; j ). W en o w turn to the c haracterization of the set of sub-




7assigned to the quan tit yv ariable is omitted as long as this do es not create
confusion). If a ￿rm decides to sta y out, it pro duces nothing and incurs no
cost. F urthermore if a ￿rm, sa y i , has decided to sta y out at p erio d t ￿ 1, it
m ust pa y a reen try cost, R
i
, if it decides to sta y in the mark et at p erio d t .
W e simplify the analysis by considering in turn tw o p olar cases namely:
Assumption 1 Re entry is unpr o￿table i.e. R
i
is as lar ge as we want, for
i =1 ; 2; 3.
Assumption 2 Re entry is c ostless i.e. R
i
=0 , for i =1 ; 2; 3.







stands for the ￿rm i ’s capacit y constrain t whic h means that,
for a giv en ￿
i
, ￿rm i cannot pro duce more than ￿ q
i
and accordingly c is only




. On the other hand, ￿
i
is a conv enien tw a y to rank
￿rms according to their marginal cost function. W e shall indeed supp ose that
for an y quan tit y q such that the marginal cost to pro duce this quan tit y is
w ell de￿ned for ￿rms i and j , ￿rm j ’s marginal cost is strictly greater than




. More precisely w a y , let X
i
=[ 0 ; ￿ q
i
],
then our assumptions regarding the v ariable cost function of an y ￿rm are the
follo wing:
Assumption 3 Let ￿ q
i
> 0. The variable c ost function is twic ec ontinuously








. In addition, c satis￿es
the fol lowing pr op erties:


























































Now let Q stand for aggregate output. A t eac h p erio d, the in v erse demand
function for the homogeneous go o d, denoted f ( Q ), satis￿es:






] , f is twic ec ontinuously di￿er en-
tiable with f ( Q ) ￿ 0 and @f = @ Q < 0.
62 The pro duction game
W e consider a sup ergame in v olving three ￿rms. W e shall denote this game
by ￿
￿
and the set of ￿rms by N .￿
￿
consists of the in￿nite rep etition of
the tw o-stage game where (i) at the ￿rst stage eac h ￿rm decides to sta yi n o r
to sta y out of the mark et and (ii) at the second stage the ￿rms whic h ha ve
decided to sta y in the mark et, hereafter referred to as the activ e ￿rms, play
an usual Cournot game whilst an inactive ￿rm pro duces nothing. A t eac h
stage decisions are made sim ultaneously and actions taken at the ￿rst stage
are p erfectly observed by all ￿rms b efore they c ho ose their pro duction at the
second stage. The scalar ￿, b elonging to the op en in terv al (0 ; 1), denotes the
discount factor common to all ￿rms.
The purp ose of this preparatory section is tw ofold. On the one hand, w e
giv e a precise conten t to the concept of a feasible cartel. On the other hand,
for eac h feasible cartel s , w e c haracterize the set of all pa yo￿ v ectors that
￿rms can obtain at a subgame p erfect Nash equilibrium of ￿
￿
where along
the equilibrium path only the ￿rms in cartel s sta y in the mark et at eac h
p erio d.
T o simplify the exp osition w e shall pro ceed in three steps. First, in sub-
section 2.1., w e shall in tro duce the assumptions on the cost and demand
functions. In the second step, in subsection 2.2., w e shall ignore the ￿rst
stage of the constituen t game and concen trate on the game ￿
￿
( s ) consisting
of the in￿nite rep etition of the Cournot game where the set of play ers is giv en
by s (i.e. ￿rms in s decide to sta y in the mark et at ev ery p erio d and the ￿rm
outside s ,i fs 6= N , decides to sta y out of the mark et at ev ery p erio d). W e
can thereb y use the results from the literature on in￿nitely rep eated games
to bring forth a c haracterization of the set of equilibrium pa y o￿ v ectors of
￿
￿
( s ) . In the last step, subsection 2.3., w e in tro duce the p ossibilit y for eac h
￿rm to exit the mark et. This will allow us to de￿ne what w e mean by a
feasible cartel and c haracterize, for eac h feasible cartel, the set of attainable




An activ e ￿rm has to pa y a (time-in v arian t) ￿xed cost F
i
as w ell as a v ariable










are (time-in v arian t) ￿rm-
sp eci￿c parameters and q
i
stands for quan tit y (the time index that should b e
5implies that ￿rm j mak es the highest equilibrium pro￿t when k sta ys on the
mark et and ￿rm k mak es the highest equilibrium pro￿t when j sta ys on.
Hence the ￿rm exiting the mark et is the one with the lowest av erage costs,
and not with the highest, as it w ould b e predicted in a w ar of attrition or in
p erfect comp etition.
One is led to w onder if the di￿erence in prediction could disapp ear if
￿rms play a sup ergame instead of a one-shot game. Indeed, in a sup ergame,
￿rms are generally able to maximize joint pro￿ts and, since joint pro￿t max-
imization requires the minimization of v ariable cost, they will b e induced to
in ternalize the gain made by ha ving an e￿cien t partner.
In what follo ws w e shall generalize the example giv en ab o v e by consider-
ing a general cost function and a pro duction game consisting of an in￿nite
rep etition of the tw o-stage game of the example. In this game, w e sa y that
at w o-￿rm cartel is feasible if there exists an equilibrium of the pro duction
game where these ￿rms sta y in and the third sta ys out along the equilib-
rium path. Obviously the analysis is in teresting only if the pro duction game
displays at least tw o di￿eren t feasible cartels.
The main results are that (i) if reen try is imp ossible, then the ￿rm with
the highest marginal cost function sta ys on at all equilibria of the cartel for-
mation game, for an y order of declaration, while ￿xed costs only determine
the set of feasible cartels. (ii) If reen try is p ossible then the ￿rm with the
highest a verage cost exits. These results imply that the di￿erence in predic-
tion do es not dep end on the p ossibilit y or not to collude, but rather dep ends
up on the existence or not of sunk costs for reen try .
An o v el implication of the presence of sunk costs app ears here: not only ,
as it is already w ell kno wn from the literature on en try preemption, they can
determine the num b er of ￿rms, but they also en ter the determination of the
typ e of ￿rms that sta y in a mark et.
The pap er is organised as follo ws: in the next Section w e in tro duce our
assumptions relative to the cost and demand functions and w e analyse the
equilibrium outcomes of the pro duction game. In Section 3, the cartel for-
mation game is formally presen ted. Our results are stated in Section 4 for
the unpro￿table reen try case and in Section 5 for the case of costless reen try .
In Section 6 w e test the robustness of the results for the case of unpro￿table
reen try to c hanges in the cartel formation game. The results stated in section
4 are sho wn to go through. Section 7 presen ts some concluding considerations
to relate the results to the literature on transaction cost economics.
4(1987)) to select one or the other.
A p ossible route to follo w for obtaining a prediction is indicated by
the literature on endogenous coalition formation, as in Aumann and My-
erson(1988), Gul (1989), and esp ecially Blo c h (1990a) and (1990b). These
w orks use a non-coop erativ e sequen tial game to analyze the formation of
coalition structures. In the same w a y , one can assume that a coalition forma-
tion game precedes the play of a game of the kind illustrated by the example
ab o ve . W e here adopt a sp eci￿cation of the coalition formation game where
eac h ￿rm in turn mak es a declaration consisting of (i) a set of ￿rms that sta y
in, (ii) a pa y o￿ v ector for the three ￿rms that can b e obtained by the play
of a non-coop erativ e equilibrium of the tw o stage game. One can in terpret
these declarations as \o￿ers", and w e mo del the acceptance (refusal) of an
o￿er as the making of an iden tical (di￿eren t) declaration. Since a declaration
corresp onds to one equilibrium, if tw o ￿rms mak e the same declaration they
agree to play the same equilibrium. This determines whic h equilibrium is
play ed and the pa yo￿s to all ￿rms irresp ectiv e of the declaration made by
the third ￿rm.
It is imp ortan t to realize that once tw o ￿rms ha v e adopted their equilib-
rium strategies the third ￿rm has no b etter alternativ e than the play of its
own b est reply to those strategies, whic h coincides with the strategy sp eci￿ed
in the equilibrium c hosen by the other tw o ￿rms. Therefore the w a yp a y o￿s
are determined has nothing to do with the application of a ma jorit y rule in
collectiv e decision making.
F or further reference w e call this sequen tial game \the cartel formation
game". The equilibrium of this game giv es a prediction of the ￿rm that exits.
F or eac h order in whic h ￿rms declare, there will b e a unique subgame p erfect
equilibrium outcome in the cartel formation game. But, as one can exp ect,
the equilibrium outcome will in general dep end on the order of declaration.
W e are nev ertheless able to sho w that, as long as a ￿rm exits the mark et
at the equilibrium, the cost c haracteristics of this ￿rm can b e iden ti￿ed and
are indep enden t of the order of declaration. The cartel formation game will
therefore pro vide a strong prediction on the c haracteristics of the exiting
￿rm.
In the example the unique equilibrium is with ￿rms j and k making the
same declaration of the form (i) f j; k g , and (ii) pa y o￿ zero for ￿rm i , and
Cournot pa y o￿s for j and k . A pro of of this statemen t is trivial. Indeed the
Cournot pro￿t of a ￿rm is increasing in the marginal cost of its riv al whic h
31 Intro duction
In mark ets where ￿rms di￿er as to their cost functions is it p ossible to predict
what are the cost c haracteristics of the ￿rms that sta y or that exit? In p er-
fectly comp etitiv e mark ets one can predict that the ￿rms exiting the mark et
are those with highest a verage costs. This prediction has b een extended by
Ghema w at and Nalebu￿ (1985), (1990) and F udenb erg and Tirole (1986) to
the case of declining industries with few comp etitors. Their analyses sho w
indeed that, in a w ar of attrition, the less e￿cien t ￿rm will b e the ￿rst to
exit
1
. How ev er many recen t w orks (see c hapters 8 and 9 in Tirole (1988)
and Wilson (1992)) sho w that exit can o ccur in a wide v ariet y of circum-
stances. W e are therefore led to ask if the ab o v e prediction contin ue to hold
in imp erfectly comp etitiv e mark ets where ￿rms are not engaged in a w ar of
attrition.
This pap er argues that the exiting ￿rm may b e the one with the lowest
average cost function. T o iden tify the basic argumen t leading to this conclu-
sion, consider the follo wing example. Three ￿rms decide, at a ￿rst stage, to
sta y in the mark et or to exit and, at a second stage, those that sta y decide
howm u c h to pro duce. All ￿rms ha ve iden tical ￿xed costs. They also ha ve
constan t marginal costs with ￿rm i ’s marginal cost b eing strictly smaller
than ￿rm j ’s marginal cost whic h, in turn, is strictly smaller than ￿rm k ’s.
Firms can therefore b e ranked according to their a v erage cost function with
￿rm i having the low est one.
Then supp ose that if all ￿rms sta y in the mark et, eac h of them will obtain
a strictly negative pro￿t at the Cournot equilibrium while, if only tw o ￿rms
sta y in, their Cournot pro￿t is p ositiv e and the third ￿rm receiv es a zero
pro￿t. It immediately follo ws that for eac h couple of ￿rms to sta y in the
mark et and to pro duce their Cournot quatit y is an equilibrium of the tw o
stage game. They are therefore three equilibria and a prediction on the cost
c haracteristics of the exiting ￿rm cannot b e based only on this tw o stage
game. Note, inciden tally , that these equilibria are all Pareto e￿cien t so that
one cannot use coalitional pro ofness (see Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston
1
F or instance, Ghema w at and Nalebuf (1985) show that in a war of attrition with
complete information where ￿rms di￿er according to their pro duction capacity , the biggest
￿rm is the ￿rst to exit. But these authors assume that ￿rms incur only a ￿ow main tenance
cost which is prop ortional to their capacity . Accordingly , the biggest ￿rm is the one with
the highest a v erage cost function.
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A bstr act
The pap er analyzes the question of whic h cost c haracteristics are exhibited
by the ￿rms that exit an oligop olistic mark et when costs are asymmetric and
￿rms can credibly b e forced out by the remaining comp etitors. The main re-
sults are: (i) if reen try is imp ossible (due to the presence of large sunk costs),
then the ￿rm with the highest marginal cost function dta ys in; if reen try is
costless then the ￿rm with the highest a verage cost exits. Consequen ty sunk
costs not only a￿ect the num b er of ￿rms in an industry , but they also en ter
the determination of the typ e of ￿rms that resist predation.
Keyw ords: endogenous coalition formation, exit, sunk costs.
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